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The European continent has experienced tremendous change since the fall of the "Iron Curtain" in 1989 and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) shortly thereafter in 1991. In fact, the newly established European Union (EU), with its "capital" in Brussels, is now in the process of accepting as new member states those countries formally aligned with the old Warsaw Pact. 2 In its effort to become a more complete union, the EU has established its own currency, the Euro, and is now in the midst of ratifying its own constitution. One area in particular that has been affected by this stand-off, and one very often overlooked, is in the arena of transatlantic armaments cooperation. For years, both sides of the Atlantic have struggled to improve the situation by promoting efficiencies through worthwhile cooperative armaments initiatives. Yet after further investigation, it appears that Europe and the United States are on separate paths regarding armaments cooperation. "In spite of many good reasons for better transatlantic cooperation and numerous initiatives to achieve that objective, the record is rather poor." 5 However, two things are certain. First, the gap between the United
States and European military capabilities continues to grow, undermining both NATO and the European allies' ability to undertake multinational and "out-of-area" joint operations outside of the NATO construct. 6 These capability gaps are primarily focused in the areas of "logistics, force protection, air/sea transport, combat search and rescue, precision weapons, command and control, surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance." 7 Secondly, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted in a much more proactive -some would say unilateralistapproach by the United States to defend itself. U.S. President George W. Bush's "coalitions of the willing" speech following 9/11 did not bode well for the future of an alliance devoid of the capability required to counter threats that emanate outside of Europe. 8 What is needed is a better understanding between NATO allies on the direction the alliance, as well as transatlantic armaments cooperation, should head in the future.
So where do we go from here? More specifically, why is greater armaments cooperation between the United States and Europe more or less important? Is it really worth the effort?
This paper will attempt to answer these and other questions by sorting through the various frameworks established by the allies regarding transatlantic armaments cooperation. It will do so by first examining the current European perspective regarding armaments cooperation, followed by the view from the United States. Finally, it will focus on the effects that the current state of armaments cooperation is having on NATO and European security as a whole.
Ultimately, this paper will propose several beneficial solutions to help strengthen transatlantic ties in future armaments cooperation.
A CHANGING EUROPE
Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less. provide for its own defense. 13 However, NATO's further usefulness was questioned when the Iron Curtain dividing Western and Eastern Europe, was torn down in 1989. 14 Soon after these momentous events, the European Union was established. It is without doubt that the security and stability fostered by NATO during the previous decades set the conditions for this integration.
A NEW UNION
The European Union officially became reality following the signing of the "Treaty on European Union," also known as the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992. 15 Its intent was to "unite" the countries of Europe into one entity with a central government, yet allowing its nation-states to retain their own identities and traditions. The EU faces many challenges, including ratification of a constitution, acceptance and approval of new members, the establishment of an economic policy and one common currency, confronting differences in language and culture, and perhaps most importantly, the defining of its own foreign and security policies. The EU's foundation rests upon three "pillars." The first is a single market based upon the passage of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985 which integrated the European commercial market. 16 The second pillar is cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, while a final pillar is a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which is the most applicable to the topic and will be discussed later in this paper.
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The challenges facing the EU are certainly daunting, however, "there is a tendency to overlook and underestimate the scale of the almost revolutionary changes which the old continent has undergone since the end of the Cold War." 18 The world is certainly watching how the EU confronts these challenges, none more so than the United States, which has a definite stake 27 During the decades prior to the EU's establishment, Europeans further attempted to stand up various organizations to centralize armaments development and procurement, but nearly all failed in their stated purpose because they lacked the authority to transcend national armaments policies and industries. 28 This, in part, led to Europe's armament sector remaining "fragmented into national markets, with costly duplication in all armamentsrelated areas." 29 Frustratingly, Europe still has yet to move beyond the status quo with respect to its armaments policies. If the allies are to continue improving their relationship regarding armaments cooperation, Europe must move away from its nationalistic tendencies.
ARMAMENTS COOPERATION: THE EUROPEAN CONSTRUCT
Our vision is clear. Europe must prepare to do more -to pull its weight. And it must develop capabilities in ways that support action in NATO as well as under European Union leadership. There is an expectation on both sides of the Atlantic that we will make real progress…we cannot afford to fail. 30 Geoffery Hoon, British Prime Minister, April 2000
Before attempting to begin understanding the current armaments cooperation situation between the United States and Europe, one must first dissect the intricate web of national politics, treaties, and various frameworks which the Europeans have constructed for themselves in this area. The idea of creating an agency to deal solely with armaments has been around for quite some time. However, too many organizations and too little power apparently plagued the armaments organizations established under the old WEU and now the EU. 31 The Maastricht
Treat of 1992 establishing the EU includes annexes for the provisions of just such an agency.
Even more recently, special provisions for a common armaments agency have been spelled "out in full in the draft constitutional treaty." 32 One major impediment, however, has been that armaments have "traditionally been a national domain" which has made it extremely difficult to harmonize European efforts to consolidate. 33 What permits national market fragmentation is an article from the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) in 1957. Article 296 states the following:
1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the application of the following rules:
(a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or the trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.
2. The Council may, acting unanimously on the proposal from the Commission, make changes to the list, which it drew up on April 1958, of the products to which the provisions of paragraph 1 b) apply. 34 It is apparent that some countries of Europe continue to reference this article as justification for maintaining their own separate armaments industries and procurement policies. 35 In yet another attempt to consolidate its efforts, the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO) was established in 1996 to "increase joint research and cooperation in defense armaments," but with limited power to award contracts, the WEAO was considered institutionally weak. 36 Despite the formation of the WEAO, there still emerged a need to have an empowered organization to deal with the ever-increasing number of joint projects and transnational companies. 37 In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy Objectives and the progressive framing of a common defense policy, we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on the European Union, the "Petersberg Tasks." To this end the Union must have capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.
The ESDP was different from any previous EU defense policy in that it was now "both separable and independent of NATO forces." 44 This was truly a bold step for the EU in exerting its presence on the world stage. The EDSP enhances the effectiveness of the CFSP by enabling the EU to independently perform such missions as humanitarian relief, peacekeeping tasks, as well as employment of combat forces in crisis management situations. 45 The EU's Helsinki Summit, held in December of 1999, established a "Headline goal" for EU member states in terms of their military capabilities for crisis management operations by laying the groundwork for a rapid reaction force (RRF) made up of a 50,000-60,000-strong army. 46 As a step toward putting a "backbone" in the ESDP, the creation of this RRF was not, however, to imply the creation of European army to duplicate the structure of NATO. 47 The rapid reaction force was once again the focus of discussion at an EU non-sanctioned 
ARMAMENTS COOPERATION: THE UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE
Perhaps at no other time in its 228-year existence has the United States of America possessed so much power --diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, America, arguably has become the sole hegemon on the planet. Still, in the wake of 9/11, the United States has boldly taken the lead in prosecuting a global war on terrorism (GWOT) and has encouraged the rest of the world to do the same. As a result of its assumed leadership role, the United States continues to allocate a large portion of its annual budget towards defense. The United States has encouraged its NATO allies for decades to increase their defense budgets and improve their military capabilities, but to no avail. That said, what is tremendously worrisome is that the growing gap between U.S. and European military capabilities continues to get worse. 55 In fact, the United States spends nearly two times more on defense (%GDP) than all EU members combined. 56 To the contrary, and thanks to America's robust and continuing contribution to NATO, Allied governments are under no pressure to increase defense spending to the NATO agreed standard of 2% of GDP, despite continued coaxing by America.
RECENT U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COOPERATION
From its perspective, the United States feels comfortable that it has made tremendous strides in its efforts to improve its transatlantic relationship regarding armaments cooperation.
To its credit, the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) in its October 1997 report entitled To advance U.S. National Security Objectives --military, economic, technical and political, through promotion of technical and industrial cooperation in the development and production of defense armaments. 59 The United States has hosted many formal and informal meetings over the years to foster armaments dialogue. These include European and Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation Symposia, as well as various NATO workshops devoted to the subject. 60 Despite the current missteps on the European side of the Atlantic, all indications are that America is fully committed to supporting transatlantic armaments cooperation.
WHAT ABOUT NATO?
NATO is the key institution of the transatlantic alliance. NATO's greatest accomplishment, of course, has been its effectiveness as a deterrent against communist aggression in Western European. In the age of nuclear weapons, this was no small task. As this threat waned, the alliance was presented with new security challenges.
During the last ten years, NATO has provided military forces outside its borders, to include Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996 and Kosovo in 1999. 65 The reality, as seen with the recent missions to Bosnia and Kosovo, is that the multinational forces of the alliance will increasingly be deployed outside of NATO territory, perhaps for years at a time. Despite its Cold War successes and recent deployments to the Balkans, NATO remains at a crossroads concerning its utility in the modern world.
NATO'S TRANSFORMATION
[NATO]…must understand the likely threats to the security of its members, decide on the capabilities needed to address those threats, and develop and field those capabilities through a combination of national and Alliance-wide efforts. and Deployable Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units. 74 A secondary goal of the program is to allow all members to provide their specialized "niche" capabilities. The PCC's overall objective is to avoid costly and unnecessary duplication of effort by NATO members regarding acquisition of armaments.
NATO also has an organization in its structure specifically dedicated to armaments-related matters. The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) meets regularly to consider all aspects of the development and procurement of equipment for NATO forces. In 1993, NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) directed the work of the CNAD towards the following key areas:
• Harmonization of military requirements on an Alliance-wide basis;
• Promotion of essential battlefield interoperability;
• Pursuit of cooperative opportunities identified by the CNAD and the promotion of improved transatlantic cooperation; • The development of critical defense technologies, including expanded technology sharing.
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The CNAD also has component sub-groups specifically devoted to addressing issues relating to land, sea, and air armaments. NATO's Research and Technology Board, as well as the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), provide the CNAD with advice and assistance regarding matters of research and technology and industry. Additionally, CNAD Partnership Groups are "active in fields such as defense procurement policy and acquisition practices, codification, quality assurance, test, and safety criteria for ammunition, and material standardization." 76 Overall, it would appear that the NATO framework is a tried and true mechanism for improving armaments dialogue and cooperation.
ARMAMENTS COOPERATION: THE ROAD AHEAD
Perspective comes also comes from acknowledging that a spectrum of views exists on both sides of the Atlantic. Our attention is drawn to extreme positions. We often fail to notice the overlaps, the middle ground. 77 Javier Solano, EU High Commissioner for Common Foreign and Security Policy
Evidence suggests the modest trend in the defense spending habits of European nations will not end anytime soon, therefore, the United States must continue to strengthen the systems and processes already in place to ensure better armaments cooperation between the allies. As the defense capabilities gap continues to grow, the battlefield performance potential of NATO forces will continue to degrade, as well. Mismatched defense capabilities, but more importantly, the problems associated with the inability to operate effectively with other member nation forces, will create dangerous and untenable conditions for coalition warfare. NATO's recent deployments and out-of-area operations during the latter half of the1990's highlighted problems that will continue to exist if immediate steps are not taken to halt this dangerous downward trend in NATO defense capabilities. It is therefore imperative that the United States, specifically the Department of Defense, continue to dialogue with European militaries and defense industries to avoid the "Fortress Europe" and "Fortress America" mentality.
The Europeans have a poor track record regarding armaments cooperation when done on a national or bilateral basis, as opposed to when accomplished within a multilateral context.
They appear to have a much better track record when cooperation occurs when NATO is involved. Therefore, NATO appears to be the logical choice to serve as a central "clearing house" for matters relating to armaments cooperation between the allies. NATO's organizational structure provides for deliberate and crisis action planning for the alliance, along with a well-established capabilities and requirements generation process. The CNAD and other armaments-related organizations provide a "skeleton" apparatus within the NATO structure capable of supporting such a "clearing house."
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are intended to improve the current state of affairs regarding transatlantic armaments cooperation:
EUROPEAN UNION
• Implement Common Foreign and Security Policy in its entirety.
• Consider the establishment of an EU-sanctioned Armaments, Research, and
Capabilities Agency (ARCA) and European Defense Equipment Market (EDEM) as suggested by Burkard Schmitt of the EU's Institute for Security Studies.
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• European industries should continue to seek U.S. defense contracts, perhaps "through teaming arrangements with U.S. companies."
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• Continue armaments-related dialogue with all concerned parties, especially the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD), NATO, and European Industry.
• Remain actively engaged in NATO's military planning processes.
UNITED STATES
• Establish permanent and formal relations between the DoD and the EU, perhaps through the office of International Cooperation within the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
• Reform/ease restrictions on current export control processes regarding technology transfer across the Atlantic.
• Set favorable conditions for increased participation by European industry in the DoD acquisition process (i.e. bidding for government contracts, etc.).
• Encourage mergers between American and European defense industries.
• Continue to encourage transatlantic armaments dialogue through frequent armaments-related workshops and symposia.
• Under the auspices of the Director, International Cooperation (USD, ATL), form a "Blue Ribbon" panel of our nation's, as well as Europe's, top defense, academic, and industry professionals in order to explore renewed options towards a better transatlantic armaments cooperation policy.
NATO
• Continue armaments-related dialogue with all concerned parties, especially the EU and the U.S. DoD.
• Continue transformation efforts to meet the challenges of the evolving security environment.
• Continue to encourage members to contribute niche capabilities to the overall alliance force structure.
• Continue to encourage the initiatives of the EU's ESDP.
• Continue to support the spirit and specifics of the "Berlin Plus" Agreement. 
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CONCLUSIONS
